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Foreword 
David M. Shapiro, Emily McCormick & Annie Prossnitz† 
These pages are the product of the first law review symposium in five 
years on solitary confinement, a topic that inspires rich discussion in 
courtrooms, universities, prisons, legislatures, and even the Vatican.1 The 
Northwestern University Law Review’s 2019 Symposium, “Rethinking 
Solitary Confinement,” brought together preeminent legal scholars and 
national experts on solitary confinement to foster interdisciplinary 
engagement on the subject. 
In 2018, Justice Sotomayor likened solitary confinement to a “penal 
tomb.”2 Many other jurists have recently joined the chorus, expressing grave 
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 1 For discussion of solitary confinement in judicial opinions, see infra notes 2–3. For scholarship on 
solitary confinement, see TERRY ALLEN KUPERS, SOLITARY: THE INSIDE STORY OF SUPERMAX 
ISOLATION AND HOW WE CAN ABOLISH IT 21 (2017); Elizabeth Alexander, “This Experiment, So Fatal”: 
Some Initial Thoughts on Strategic Choices in the Campaign Against Solitary Confinement, 5 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 1, 13 (2015); Elizabeth Bennion, Banning the Bing: Why Extreme Solitary Confinement 
Is Cruel and Far Too Unusual Punishment, 90 IND. L.J. 741, 742 (2015); Mariam Hinds & John Butler, 
Solitary Confinement: Can the Courts Get Inmates out of the Hole?, 11 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 331, 334 
(2015); Michael B. Mushlin, “I Am Opposed to This Procedure”: How Kafka’s In the Penal Colony 
Illuminates the Current Debate About Solitary Confinement and Oversight of American Prisons, 93 OR. 
L. REV. 571, 606–07 (2015); Keramet Reiter, Supermax Administration and the Eighth Amendment: 
Deference, Discretion, and Double Bunking, 1986–2010, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 89, 91–92 (2015); 
Deema Nagib, Note, Jail Isolation After Kingsley: Abolishing Solitary Confinement at the Intersection 
of Pretrial Incarceration and Emerging Adulthood, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2915, 2918 (2017); Eleanor 
Umphres, Note, Solitary Confinement: An Unethical Denial of Meaningful Due Process, 30 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1057, 1058–59 (2017). For discussion of solitary confinement protests among prisoners, 
see, for example, Joe Watson, Prisoners Protest Solitary Confinement at Illinois Facility, PRISON LEGAL 
NEWS (June 3, 2016), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2016/jun/3/prisoners-protest-solitary-
confinement-illinois-facility/ [https://perma.cc/FY78-3E5V]. For legislative reform and policy change, 
see, for example, THE ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS & THE LIMAN CTR. FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW AT 
YALE LAW SCH., REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: THE 2018 ASCA-LIMAN NATIONWIDE SURVEY 
OF TIME-IN-CELL 60–66 (2018). For discussion of papal condemnation, see Adrienne Gavula, Pope 
Francis: Solitary Confinement Is Torture, ACLU OHIO (Nov. 12, 2014), 
https://www.acluohio.org/archives/blog-posts/solitary-confinement-is-torture [https://perma.cc/7GFW-
HB9J]. 
 2 Apodaca v. Raemisch, 139 S. Ct. 5, 10 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., statement respecting denial of 
certiorari). 
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concerns about long-term human isolation.3 Meanwhile, ever-mounting 
evidence shows that solitary confinement can induce and exacerbate severe 
mental illness, provoke self-mutilation and suicide, and cause the brain to 
literally shrink in physical size.4 
Solitary confinement is known by many names—supermax prisons, 
disciplinary segregation, Special Housing Units (SHUs), Special 
Management Units (SMUs), and Administrative Segregation Units (ASUs 
or Ad-Seg), to list just a few. But regardless of the name used, solitary 
confinement generally refers to the practice of keeping inmates alone in a 
cell, in conditions designed to sharply curtail human interaction, for twenty-
two to twenty-four hours a day.5 Isolation cells in Illinois’s Stateville 
Correctional Center typify solitary confinement quarters: small chambers 
with “gray walls, a solid steel door, no window, no clock, and a light that [i]s 
kept on twenty-four hours a day.”6 
In addition to the social isolation, sensory deprivation, and physical 
harms inflicted by solitary confinement, extreme isolation also causes 
significant mental and psychological injuries. They include: “negative 
attitudes and affect, insomnia, anxiety, panic, withdrawal, hypersensitivity, 
ruminations, cognitive dysfunction, hallucinations, loss of control, 
irritability, aggression, and rage, paranoia, hopelessness, lethargy, 
depression, a sense of impending emotional breakdown, self-mutilation, and 
suicidal ideation and behavior.”7 While solitary confinement cells house 2% 
to 8% of the American prison population, they account for almost half of all 
inmate suicides.8 
 
 3 Williams v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 567–68 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that both 
“psychological damage” and “[p]hysical harm” can result from solitary confinement, including “high 
rates of suicide and self-mutilation” as well as “more general physical deterioration”); Shepard v. Quillen, 
840 F.3d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 2016) (describing “the horrors of solitary confinement”); Kervin v. Barnes, 
787 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir. 2015) (emphasizing the “serious psychological consequences of such quasi-
solitary imprisonment”); Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 534 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Prolonged solitary 
confinement exacts a heavy psychological toll that often continues to plague an inmate’s mind even after 
he is resocialized.”). 
 4 See Jules Lobel & Huda Akil, Law & Neuroscience: The Case of Solitary Confinement, 147 
DAEDALUS 61, 69–70 (2018). 
 5 VALERIE KIEBALA & SAL RODRIGUEZ, SOLITARY WATCH, FAQ: SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1 (2018). 
 6 Atul Gawande, Hellhole, NEW YORKER (Mar. 23, 2009), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/03/30/hellhole [https://perma.cc/5SC9-9JRN]. 
 7 Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax” Confinement, 
49 CRIME & DELINQ. 124, 130–31 (2003) (citations omitted). 
 8 Bennion, supra note 1, at 757. 
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Speakers brought a wide range of expertise to the Symposium—legal, 
correctional, personal, historical, medical, and psychological. In his keynote 
address, Senator Dick Durbin, the sponsor of federal legislation that would 
limit solitary confinement,9 reflected on two solitary survivors who testified 
before Congress. Senator Durbin quoted Damon Thibodeaux, who spent 
fifteen years in solitary confinement: 
“More than anything solitary confinement is an existence without hope. I do not 
condone what those who have killed and committed other serious offenses have 
done. But I also don’t condone what we do to them when we put them in solitary 
for years on end and treat them as sub-human. We’re better than that. As a 
civilized society, we should be better than that.” Mr. Thibodaux was right 
then—he’s still right.10 
Following opening remarks by Dean Kimberly A. Yuracko, speakers 
included: former prisoners who survived solitary confinement (Brian Nelson 
and Albert Woodfox), legal scholars who study incarceration and the Eighth 
Amendment (Sharon Dolovich, Jules Lobel, Judith Resnik, and John 
Stinneford), medical and psychological experts (Craig Haney and Brie 
Williams), the head of a state correctional system (Leann Bertsch), and 
advocates working to limit, if not eliminate, prolonged solitary confinement 
(Amy Fettig, Maggie Filler, Daniel Greenfield, Alan Mills, Laura Rovner, 
and Margo Schlanger). 
The contents of this issue reflect the interdisciplinary character of the 
convening. The issue begins with three histories of solitary confinement: an 
English and early American legal history of constraints on punishments that 
resembled solitary confinement in their level of severity; a judicial history in 
which courts sanctioned the practice even as they struck down other harsh 
and harmful prison conditions, and a social and political history of its rapid 
spread during the tough on crime era. First, Professor John Stinneford offers 
an originalist critique of administrative discretion over prolonged isolation 
in Is Solitary Confinement a Punishment?11 From English and American 
legal history, including the U.S. Supreme Court decision In re Medley,12 
Professor Stinneford derives the rule that a prison condition amounts to a 
punishment if it: (1) was “historically used as a heightened form of 
punishment” or (2) “inflict[s] substantial suffering beyond what is normally 
imposed by a prison sentence.”13 He contends that solitary confinement is 
 
 9 Solitary Confinement Reform Act, S. 719, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 10 Senator Dick Durbin, Keynote Address at the Northwestern University Law Review Symposium, 
“Rethinking Solitary Confinement” (Nov. 8, 2019) [hereinafter Senator Durbin Keynote Address]. 
 11 John Stinneford, Is Solitary Confinement a Punishment?, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 9 (2020). 
 12 134 U.S. 160 (1890). 
 13 Stinneford, supra note 11, at 15. 
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sufficiently harmful to meet the second prong of this disjunctive test and thus 
to qualify as punishment. This conclusion strikes at the premise that a prison 
sentence alone authorizes a prison official to impose solitary confinement as 
a matter of administrative discretion. On the contrary, solitary confinement 
is an additional punishment superadded to the fact of incarceration. A 
panoply of constitutional protections that restrict the government’s power to 
punish therefore apply to solitary confinement. 
In Punishment in Prison: Constituting the “Normal” and the 
“Atypical” in Solitary and Other Forms of Confinement,14 Professor Judith 
Resnik and her coauthors explore the stakes—for the incarcerated, for courts, 
and for the body politic—of judicial engagement with in-prison 
punishments. They show that over the span of sixty years, the federal 
judiciary came to reject filth, squalor, violence, and racial discrimination as 
unconstitutional prison conditions, even though these features of 
incarceration were commonplace. But the courts also accepted other harsh 
deprivations, solitary confinement among them, as “normal” in the prison 
environment, and consequently insulated them from judicial review. 
Through data collected from more than 9,000 lower court decisions, 
Professor Resnik and her coauthors show that while solitary confinement 
may be “normal” in U.S. prisons, courts and prison administrators alike have 
a key role to play in curtailing the practice. 
In Mass Solitary and Mass Incarceration: Explaining the Dramatic 
Rise in Prolonged Solitary in America’s Prisons,15 Professor Jules Lobel 
considers a common explanation for the rise of isolation in the 1980s and 
1990s: in the main, increasing prison violence drove the expansion of solitary 
confinement. Contrary to this thesis, Professor Lobel contends that solitary 
confinement flourished in large measure because it offered a tool of social 
control as prison officials confronted growing ranks of “rebellious 
prisoners—often, but not exclusively, African-American—who had 
organized protests and disobedient conduct in American prisons from the 
1960s to the 1980s.”16 As American corrections barreled toward mass 
isolation, alternatives for high-security incarceration without extreme 
isolation piled up on the wayside. But these models have new relevance 
 
 14 Judith Resnik, Hirsa Amin, Sophie Angelis, Megan Hauptman, Laura Kokotailo, Aseem Mehta, 
Madeline Silva, Tor Tarantola & Meredith Wheeler, Punishment in Prison: Constituting the “Normal” 
and the “Atypical” in Solitary and Other Forms of Confinement, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 45 (2020). 
 15 Jules Lobel, Mass Solitary and Mass Incarceration: Explaining the Dramatic Rise in Prolonged 
Solitary in America’s Prisons, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 159 (2020). 
 16 Id. at 159. 
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today as corrections reformers take steps to curtail prolonged solitary 
confinement. 
Professors Stinneford, Resnik, and Lobel each combine, in different 
ways, their historical analysis with the premise that prolonged inmate 
isolation can be not only unpleasant and undesirable, but harmful, indeed 
ruinous. In The Science of Solitary: Expanding the Harmfulness Narrative,17 
Professor Craig Haney defends that premise against a small number of 
dissenters who dismiss the effects as unproven, repeat the mantra “more 
research is needed,” or consider the harm minimal or fleeting. The evidence 
specific to solitary confinement is compelling and conclusive in itself, 
Professor Haney argues, but it also represents only a subset of a much larger 
scientific literature that proves the adverse consequences of analogous 
experiences: “[W]hat we know about the negative psychological effects of 
prison isolation is situated in a much larger scientific literature about the 
harmfulness of social isolation, loneliness, and social exclusion in society 
more generally.”18 Moreover, the damage inflicted by solitary confinement 
is severe and persistent, with some of the dire harms manifesting most clearly 
and strongly after release from isolation. These harms can include permanent 
incapacitation of the ability to form human connections. 
The final three Essays discuss advocacy strategies for curtailing solitary 
confinement. First, in A Wrong Without a Right? Overcoming the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act’s Physical Injury Requirement in Solitary 
Confinement Cases,19 Maggie Filler and Daniel Greenfield examine a 
provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) that often poses an 
obstacle to solitary confinement litigation: the “physical injury” requirement 
applicable to claims for monetary damages. This rule, purportedly conceived 
to weed out frivolous lawsuits while allowing meritorious claims to proceed 
to court, frequently slams the courthouse door on litigants seeking redress 
for barbaric conditions of confinement. Filler and Greenfield put forward an 
interpretation of the PLRA’s physical injury requirement that aligns both 
with Congress’s intent to squelch litigation over trivial injuries and with the 
scientific consensus on the physiological toll of isolation. By offering 
strategies for proving physical injury caused by solitary confinement and 
challenging the mental injury versus physical injury dichotomy, Filler and 
 
 17 Craig Haney, The Science of Solitary: Expanding the Harmfulness Narrative, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 
211 (2020). 
 18 Id. at 221. 
 19 Maggie Filler & Daniel Greenfield, A Wrong Without a Right? Overcoming the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act’s Physical Injury Requirement in Solitary Confinement Cases, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 257 
(2020). 
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Greenfield provide a framework for litigating meritorious damages claims 
for unconstitutional and abusive solitary confinement. 
Professor Margo Schlanger turns to a debate over models for change in 
Incrementalist vs. Maximalist Reform: Solitary Confinement Case Studies.20 
Maximalists warn that an incrementalist approach to eliminating solitary 
confinement for particular populations normalizes its use for certain 
prisoners, namely those who are less vulnerable. On the other hand, 
incrementalists argue that gradual reform is more effective in reducing the 
number of prisoners in solitary confinement: Only when the number of 
prisoners in solitary has decreased can officials focus on abolishing the 
practice. Professor Schlanger grounds this debate in case studies of solitary 
reform in Massachusetts, where incrementalist reform has proven successful, 
and in Indiana, where it has been less so. Ultimately, she concludes that 
incrementalist reform is likely the most promising path toward solitary 
confinement abolition. Not only do incremental reforms grow “reform 
capacity and credibility,” but the alleged need for prisoner isolation “is 
undermined by every day that passes without incident for a person who was 
previously said to need solitary confinement.”21 
In How Do We Reach a National Tipping Point in the Campaign to Stop 
Solitary?,22 Amy Fettig analyzes why this moment is ripe for solitary reform. 
Examining several harrowing cases of solitary confinement’s consequences, 
including those of her own clients, she lays out the human rights crisis this 
practice has wrought. However, hope for reform remains. Fettig attributes 
this prospect to the strategic, sustained advocacy of solitary survivors and 
civil rights lawyers. The movement to stop solitary has also grown through 
international human rights standards, governmental allies, and an emerging 
public awareness fostered by media coverage. Yet, to truly realize solitary 
reform, Fettig contends that we need further public mobilization, research 
into alternative practices, and greater prison oversight. Only then will we 
reach the national tipping point we have been inching toward for the past ten 
years. 
This issue concludes with a Consensus Statement born of another 
interdisciplinary conference, the Santa Cruz Summit in May 2018.23 This 
Summit brought together international experts on solitary confinement to 
 
 20 Margo Schlanger, Incrementalist vs. Maximalist Reform: Solitary Confinement Case Studies, 
115 NW. U. L. REV. 273 (2020). 
 21 Id. at 309. 
 22 Amy Fettig, How Do We Reach a National Tipping Point in the Campaign to Stop Solitary?, 
115 NW. U. L. REV. 311 (2020). 
 23 Consensus Statement from the Santa Cruz Summit on Solitary Confinement and Health, 115 NW. 
U. L. REV. 335 (2020). 
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review and discuss current knowledge on the broad effects of the practice 
and its current scientific, correctional, and human rights status. Summit 
participants also discussed the ethical principles that should govern its use 
and identified the most important directions for reform. The Summit resulted 
in a set of guiding principles to advance solitary confinement reform both in 
the United States and internationally. As many Summit participants were 
also Symposium speakers, we conclude our issue with the Consensus 
Statement to reflect our hope that this issue may serve as a handbook for 
legal community members engaged in solitary confinement reform efforts. 
We view the Statement as an embodiment of Senator Durbin’s sentiment: 




 24 See Senator Durbin Keynote Address, supra note 10. 
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